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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Criminal Responsibility-THE DuIAM RULE. In December 1967,
the defendant was convicted by a jury of rape, robbery, and assault with
a deadly weapon. On appeal he contended that judgment of acquittal
by reason of insanity should have been rendered; however, the convic-
tion was affirmed.'
In upholding the conviction, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that psychiatrists should be prohibited from testi-
fying whether the alleged criminal act was the "product" of mental
illness, since this is part of the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.2
In effect, this holding modified the Durham rule3 of criminal responsi-
bility which this court had phrased in 1954.:
There are three major tests of criminal responsibility which have been
adhered to at one time or another by the Federal Courts of the District
of Columbia. In this jurisdiction once the defendant raises the issue by
the presentation of some evidence of insanity, the government has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was sane
when the act was committed.5 The first test of criminal responsibility
followed by this court was the majority rule6 established in the M'Nagb-
ten case.7 The rationale espoused in the M'Naghten test was that an
accused would be excused from punishment if as a result of mental dis-
ease he did not know the nature and quality of his act, or if he did know
it, he did not know the act itself was wrong.' In 1929, apparently feeling
that the M'Naghten or "right-wrong" test was overly harsh in that the
accused was exempted from punishment only in cases of extreme in-
sanity involving a total loss of understanding, the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia supplemented this rule of insanity with the
1. Washington v. United States, 390 F. 2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
2. Id. at 456.
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4. It has long been suggested that courts have an inherent power to adopt new
doctrines and apply them to parties presently before court or even retroactively. See
NI..R.B. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. 195 F. 2d 141, 148 (9th Cir. 1952); Great Northern
Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Carpenter, Court Decisions
and the Common Law, 17 COLUM. L. Rav. 593, 606-07 (1917); Moore and Oglebuy,
The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of the Case, 21 TExAs L. REv. 514, 535
(1943).
5. Tatum v. United States, 190 F. 2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Wright v. United
States, 250 F. 2d 4, 7 (1957).
6. See, e.g., Weihofen, The M'Naghten Rule in its Present Day Setting, FEDERAL
PRoBAAioN 8 (1953).
7. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
8. Id. at 722.
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"irresistible impulse" test.9 Under this new standard the defendant is
immune from the consequences of his criminal act if it is proved that he
was "impelled to do the act by an irresistible impulse." 10 That is, if "his
reasoning powers were so far dethroned by his diseased mental condi-
tion as to deprive him of the will power to resist the insane impulse to
perpetrate the deed, though knowing it to be wrong," 11 he is not crimi-
nally responsible.
On July 1, 1954, in Durham v. U. S.,' 2 the present court formulated
yet a third test of criminal responsibility to be applied to all future crim-
inal cases in the District of Columbia. Simply stated, the Durham rule
holds that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of a "mental disease or defect." "
Multiple in purpose, the Durham rule was designed to: (1) broaden
the scope of the pre-existing tests of insanity in conformance with the
advancement of medical psychiatry into fields of mental illness hereto-
fore never studied; 14 (2) strengthen the lines of communication between
the expert witnesses and the courts; 5 (3) allow the jury to consider
psychiatric testimony on all facets of the accused's condition including
not only his ability to distinguish right from wrong and his ability to
control impulses but also any history of prior mental illness, presence of
delusions or imaginary physical pains, and I.Q. score;'0 and (4) the im-
provement of psychiatric testimony by allowing the expert in his own
terms to relate to the jury the many elements upon which his conclusion
was reached.17 Thus the objective of the Durham rule was to allow the
9. Smith v. United States, 36 F. 2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
10. Id. at 549.
11. Sd. at 549.
12. 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
13. Id. at 874-75.
14. "In this jurisdiction the rule as to insanity had become sloganized by many
years of use into a combination 'right-wrong and irresistible impulse' test.
... But 'impulse' carries a connotation of suddenness and we know there
are many readily recognizable diseases of the mind which do not involve
sudden impulses, slow deterioration, brooding, depressions, constant pres-
sures, ere.... The Durham case merely extended the established rule to
apply the defense to all acts which would not have been committed
except for a mental illness of the accused."
Carter v. United States, 252 F. 2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
15. KIrash, The Durham Rule And judicial Administration Of The Insanity Defense
In The District Of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 928 (1961).
16. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 872 (1954).
17. Washington v. United States, 390 F. 2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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jury the benefit of adequate explanation of the defendant's mental state
at the time of the offense.1 8
Although the Durham test has the approval of many psychiatrists,:"
its rationale has been rejected by various federal and state2' courts.
This pattern of rejection has as its source the problems which the Dur-
ham rule created in actual practice.2 2 Due to confusion as to what con-
stituted "mental disease or defect" and because of a general misunder-
standing by the trial courts as to the function of expert psychiatric testi-
mony, the purpose of the Durham rule was never fully achieved. To
clear up the first point of confusion, the court in McDonald v. U. S.,
18. Carter v. United States, 252 F. 2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cit. 1960).
19. See, Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of The Same Coin, 22
U. Cm. L. REv. 320 (1955); Zilborg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. Cm.
L. Rnv. 331 (1955); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Cm.
L. Rav. 331 (1955).
20. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 237 F. 2d 118, 127 (9th Cir. 1956); Voss v.
United States, 259 F. 2d 699 (8th Cit. 1958); Sauer v. United States, 241 F. 2d 640 (9th
Cir. 1957); United States v. Hopkins, 169 F. Supp. 187, 189 (D. Md. 1958); Howard v.
United States, 229 F. 2d 602 (5th Cir. 1956). See also, United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.
M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954); United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R.
346 (1954).
21. The courts of twenty-three states have declined to follow the Durham formula.
Arizona: State v. Crose, 357 P. 2d 136 (Ariz. 1960); Arkansas: Downs v. State, 330
S.W. 2d 281 (Ark. 1959); California: People v. Ryan, 140 Cal. App. 2d 412, 295 P. 2d
496, (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Colorado: Early v. People, 352 P. 2d 112 (Colo. 1960);
Connecticut: State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 148 A. 2d 251 (1959); Florida: Picott v.
State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1959); Illinois: People v. Carpenter, 11 11. 2d 60, 142 N.E.
2d 11 (1957); Indiana: Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 39 N.E. 2d 185 (1956); Kansas:
State v. Andrews, 357 P. 2d 739 (Kan. 1960); Maryland: Cole v. State, 212 Md. 55,
128 A. 2d 437 (1957); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150
N.E. 2d 914 (1958); Minnesota: State v. Finn, 100 N.W. 2d 508 (Minn. 1960); Missouri:
State v. Goza, 317 S.W. 2d 609 (Mo. 1958); Montana: State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331,
286 P. 2d 1079 (1955); Nevada: Sollars v. State, 73 Nev. 248, 316 P. 2d 917 (1957);
New Jersey: State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 132 A. 2d 50 (1959); New York: People v.
Johnson, 169 N.Y.S. 2d 217 (Westchester County Ct. 1957); Ohio: State v. Robinson,
168 N.E. 2d 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Novak, 395
Pa. 199, 150 A. 2d 102 (1959); Utah: State v. Kirkham, 17 Utah 2d 108, 319 P. 2d 859
(1958); Vermont: State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 132 A. 2d 623 (1957); Washington: State
v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 314 P. 2d 660 (1957); Wisconsin: Kwoseh v. State, 8 Wis.
2d 640, 100 N.W. 2d 339 (1960).
22. Aside from the difficulties inherent in possibly differing legal and medical defi-
nitions of the terms "insanity" or "mental disease or defect" it is apparent that even the
doctors have difficulty in classifying patients whose mental disorder is on the fringe
area which separates the sane from the mentally deranged. See Waelder, Psychiatry and
the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 384 (1952).
23. "Mental disease" or "mental defect" which will excuse defendant from criminal
responsibility for unlawful acts ". . . includes any abnormal condition of the mind
[Vol. 9:11621174
CURRENT DECISIONS
gave mental disease a legal definition to ensure that the views of the
psychiatric experts would not be binding on the fact finder, thereby
hopefully providing a basis upon which the jury could make its own
,decision as to the accused's mental state. Legal definitions, however,
were not a solution to the more significant problem of conclusory psy-
.chiatric testimony. This problem is exemplified in Rollerson v. U. S.24
where an expert witness testified that the defendant had a "paranoid
personality," that this was a mental disease, and that in his opinion the
-crime was a product of the disease. This testimony is conclusory in two
.senses: first of all the witness gave a legal conclusion that the accused
is criminally responsible for his acts, rather than stating a medical opin-
ion; secondly, the witness stated that the defendant had a mental disease
known as "paranoid personality" without any underlying explanations
as to how he reached such a conclusion.25 Thus, one of the main objec-
tives of the Durham rule, the broadening of expert testimony, was
thwarted by the trial court's permitting expert witnesses to testify as to
whether the criminal act was a "product" of the accused's mental dis-
.ease. As a result of this development the testimony became extremely
narrow, conclusory, uninformative, and of little aid to the jury in de-
ciding the criminal responsibility of the defendant.2 6
which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs
behavior controls." Hawkins v. United States, 310 F. 2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
McDonald v. United States, 312 F. 2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
24. 343 F. 2d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
25. In United States v. Amburgey, 189 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1960), the court held
that "... . if the trier believes they [the experts' opinions] are logically arrived at, they
are accepted; if not, they are rejected. It is precisely because the conclusions of the
experts must be weighed in this fashion that it is necssary to probe their bases." Id.
-at 695.
26. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 250 F. 2d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Hopkins v.
United States, 275 F. 2d 155, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Martin v. United States, 248 F. 2d
217 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Jackson v. United States, 336 F. 2d 579, 582-85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
,See also, Watson, Durham Plus Five Years: Development of the Law of Criminal Re-
sponsibility in the District of Columbia, 116 Am. J. PsYcmATRY, 289-90 (1959). In this
article the writer compared the trial transripts of cases adhering to the M'Naghten rule
.and post-Durham decisions in the District of Columbia to measure the impact of the
Durham rule and concluded:
"The most striking feature of the post-Durham insanity cases is the failure
by nearly all psychiatric experts to utilize the new rule for its intended
purpose.... The testimony of most of the psychiatric experts continued
to list classical symptoms of psychiatric syndromes, without discussing them
from the standpoint of how they motivated or were related to the alleged
criminal act. The records are replete with such words as 'insanity', 'psychosis',
'schizophrenia', and 'irresistible impulse', the peculiar clichied idiom of this
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Here, in Washington v. U. S.,27 the court recognized a need for judi-
cial supervision at the trial court level28 and attempted to solve the exist-
ing difficulties by issuing standardized explanatory instructions for use in
all trials involving an insanity defense.2 9 These instructions advise the
psychiatrist as to what kind of information they are expected to provide;
moreover, to ensure that counsel and the jury are also advised, the trial
judge will read the instructions before any expert testimony is given.
Quite obviously the instructions are designed to advise the psychiatrist
not to express his opinion on whether or not the alleged criminal act
was a product of a mental disease.
By its holding in Washington, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has modified the application of the Durham rule
which previously allowed psychiatrists to testify in terms of product and
causation. Although the court now seeks to limit expert testimony, the
Durham rule itself has not been altered, for the basis of jury determina-
tion of criminal responsibility will still be whether or not the criminal
act was the product of a mental disease. It would appear that this re-
striction on expert testimony may be conducive to highly informative
fact analyses of the accused's mental condition as opposed to limited
testimony concentrated on product and causation, but its effectiveness
and value as a rule of evidence will only be ascertained by its practical
application at the trial court level.
kind of case for more than 100 years. We find prosecution and defense
counsel frequently utilizing psychiatric language they obviously do not
comprehend. Likewise, psychiatrists glibly use expressions like 'incompe-
tent', 'unsound mind', and 'insane'; legal words with no psychiatric or
medical meaning. In short, discussions between psychiatrists and lawyers
remained at the pre-Durham level, where stereo-typed language, long since
isolated from the roots of its legal or medical meaningfulness, continued as
the principal vehicle for communication. Little if anything comprehensible
or useful was conveyed to jury or judge in this manner, and their fact-
finding about sanity surely was due to impulse and chance as often as it
was to reason."
27. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
28. "The ultimate responsibility-and power-to prevent witnesses from violating
rules of evidence lies with judges." Campbell v. United States, 307 F. 2d 547, 614 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
29. In the present case explanatory instructions are set out in the appendix of the
decision and are entitled, "Courts Instruction to Expert Witness in Cases Involving the
Insanity Defense". Washington v. United States, 390 F. 2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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